Intermediary Complexity in Regulatory Governance

Nicole De Silva

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2017, vol. 670, issue 1, 170-188

Abstract: While regulatory governance can be theorized as a three-party game in which regulators use intermediaries to influence targets, I show how regulatory intermediaries can, through delegation and orchestration, engage their own “subintermediaries†to increase their capacity for fulfilling their regulatory mandates and their influence on regulators and targets. I elucidate how the International Criminal Court (ICC)—the key intermediary in the regulatory regime for international crimes—has used nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs’) advocacy, expertise, and operational capacities to compensate for its limited capabilities. Through NGO intermediaries, the ICC has aimed to increase its ability to prosecute, punish, and thus regulate international crimes; amplify its influence on state regulators and potential perpetrators; and improve the regulation of international crimes overall.

Keywords: International Criminal Court; international crimes; human rights; nongovernmental organizations; NGOs; delegation; orchestration; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:170-188

DOI: 10.1177/0002716217696085

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