Brighter and Darker Sides of Intermediation

Jeroen van der Heijden

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2017, vol. 670, issue 1, 207-224

Abstract: This article addresses two specific puzzles in the area of regulation. The first is the engagement of regulatory intermediaries by the targets of regulation. The second is a tendency for regulatory intermediaries, once added to the regulatory landscape, to expand their roles independently and for reasons of self-interest. The article offers important insights into the roles, opportunities, and constraints of regulatory intermediaries, particularly because it moves beyond the unidirectional understanding of the regulatory process that is at the base of the RIT model. After exploring both puzzles, the article discusses how (target-oriented or self-interested) intermediation may increase the complexity and impact of regulatory capture. It concludes, however, that while the model of intermediation is sometimes flawed, regulators and targets are generally better off with the involvement of regulatory intermediaries than without it.

Keywords: regulatory intermediaries; building regulation; urban governance; regulatory capture; regulatory governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002716217693583 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:207-224

DOI: 10.1177/0002716217693583

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().