 Regulatory Stewardship and IntermediationTom Pegram The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2017, vol. 670, issue 1, 225-244 Abstract: The regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) framework exposes the potential for intermediaries to provide alternative channels for capture. In this article, I argue that the risk of capture can be mitigated through what I call regulatory stewardship—a novel conception of regulatory management that involves the intermediaries themselves monitoring the performance of one another. I explore regulatory stewardship by examining a new generation of human rights treaty innovation: the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). These instruments differentially formalize relations between intermediaries. I use their contrasting experiences to identify three factors central to effective regulatory stewardship: (1) the nature of the task environment, (2) the quality of rule frameworks, and (3) the approaches adopted by potential stewards in practice. This study argues for the importance of regulatory stewardship within RIT arrangements, particularly where targets are strongly motivated to resist implementation. Keywords: human rights; regulation; international organization; governance; theory and practice; United Nations (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:225-244 Access Statistics for this article More articles in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |
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