Enriching the RIT Framework

Kenneth W. Abbott, David Levi-Faur and Duncan Snidal

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2017, vol. 670, issue 1, 280-288

Abstract: Regulation should be theorized as a three-party relationship (RIT), with intermediaries (I) playing diverse roles between the regulator (R) and the targets of regulation (T). Here we summarize and assess extensions of the basic RIT model introduced in the volume, including changes in regulatory relationships over time, chains of regulatory actors, and networks. We also draw lessons for regulatory policy from the volume as a whole, emphasizing the diverse goals that intermediaries pursue; the importance of how, and by whom, intermediaries are selected; the pathologies, such as regulatory capture, that may result from intermediaries’ character, goals, and origins; and opportunities to mitigate these pathologies through regulatory design.

Keywords: intermediaries; regulation; regulatory design; capture; public interest; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:280-288

DOI: 10.1177/0002716217694593

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