Regulating Organized Crime

Lars Korsell

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2018, vol. 679, issue 1, 158-177

Abstract: A significant percentage of organized crime exploits regulated markets by offering services and goods without complying with relevant regulations. This may include offers of “tax-free†goods such as tobacco and alcohol, or unreported employment. Although regulatory schemes may in this way create opportunities for organized crime, situational crime prevention can also be built into, or established ancillary to, regulations. This article discusses the significant opportunities for crime prevention in regulatory schemes by using situational crime prevention as an analytical tool. I show how incorporating crime prevention rules into legislation—a step customarily known as “crime proofing†—combats organized crime by using administrative measures.

Keywords: organized crime; regulation; situational crime prevention; administrative measures; crime proofing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:679:y:2018:i:1:p:158-177

DOI: 10.1177/0002716218782654

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