How Labor Market Institutions Matter for Worker Compensation

Ryan Nunn and Jennifer Hunt

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2021, vol. 695, issue 1, 225-241

Abstract: Labor markets deviate substantially from the competitive ideal, and policies and institutions affect workers’ outcomes. Over the last 45 years, the dramatic increase in compensation of high earners and weak or stagnant growth for low and middle earners have shone a spotlight on the ways in which labor market institutions sometimes work to the detriment of lower-paid workers. In this article, we survey several institutions—minimum wages, private sector unions, noncompete agreements, and occupational licensing—considering how they have evolved in ways that affect workers’ outcomes, given that the labor market is characterized by uneven distribution of market gains. We describe the modern labor market as one that substantially features alternative work arrangements and labor market concentration, and we consider the implications of this for public policy. Those policies, along with the surveyed institutions, are the focus of our final section that discusses key options for improving worker outcomes.

Keywords: labor market institutions; wages; labor market policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00027162211035965 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:695:y:2021:i:1:p:225-241

DOI: 10.1177/00027162211035965

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().