Which States Adopt Election-Subversion Policies?

Jacob M. Grumbach and Charlotte Hill

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2023, vol. 708, issue 1, 243-256

Abstract: Research highlights a growing divergence among U.S. states in their costs of voting, the partisan balance of their legislative districts, and the responsiveness of state policy to public opinion. Less is known, however, about a new and acute threat to democracy at the state level: policies that increase the states’ vulnerability to election subversion. In this article, we investigate recent trends in state legislation that transfer election administration authority from independent to partisan actors, making it more likely that a losing presidential candidate could take office over the will of the electorate. We find that Republican control of state legislatures and the closeness of the 2020 presidential election are associated with these policies. Interestingly, these policies are mostly uncorrelated with gerrymandering and voter suppression policies that were enacted in the 2010s. We conclude with a discussion of how a recent Electoral Count Act reform in Congress partly mitigates the risk of election subversion.

Keywords: election subversion; democracy; state government; federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:708:y:2023:i:1:p:243-256

DOI: 10.1177/00027162241232809

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