Legislative Capture in Hungary: Well-Managed Autocratization

Zsolt Enyedi and Bálint Mikola

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2024, vol. 712, issue 1, 34-46

Abstract: We discuss the case of Hungary’s rapid democratic backsliding under Viktor Orbán as an example of legislative capture. We show that, despite relatively unfavorable conditions for autocratization, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party have supervised a well-crafted project of institutional transformation and a comprehensive regrouping of financial resources, all of which have led to an effective and stable concentration of power. This power concentration has its limits, given the country’s membership in the European Union, resistance by parts of the judiciary, media initiatives focused on corruption, and local opposition victories; but the national government’s room for maneuver has increased every year since 2010. We provide an overview of the changes that facilitated democratic erosion and an inventory of the actors that still retain a capacity to hinder further autocratization.

Keywords: Hungary; Viktor Orbán; legislative capture; autocratization; illiberalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:712:y:2024:i:1:p:34-46

DOI: 10.1177/00027162241307778

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