Optimal Privatisation Policy under Private Leadership in Mixed Oligopolies

Ming Hsin Lin and Toshihiro Matsumura

Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2018, vol. 17, issue 1, 1-14

Abstract: Abstract We discuss optimal privatisation policies in mixed oligopolies in which a public firm is the Stackelberg follower (private leadership). We find that under constant marginal cost, the optimal degree of privatisation is zero. When the marginal cost is increasing, however, the optimal degree is never zero, and full privatisation can be optimal. These results suggest that the optimal privatisation policy depends on the cost conditions. We also find that the optimal degree of privatisation is substantially lower under private leadership than in the simultaneous-move model when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.

Keywords: Private leadership; Mixed oligopoly; mixed ownership in public firms; linear costs; quadratic costs; JEL: H42, L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0976747918778441 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Privatization Policy under Private Leadership in Mixed Oligopolies (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:artjou:v:17:y:2018:i:1:p:1-14

DOI: 10.1177/0976747918778441

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().