Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2022, vol. 21, issue 1, 27-42

Abstract: This article considers two Stackelberg games in which a state-owned firm competes against a foreign labour-managed firm. The first game is as follows. In the first stage, the state-owned firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. In the second stage, the foreign labour-managed firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. In the third stage, both firms simultaneously and independently choose actual outputs. The structure of the second game is nearly identical and differs only in the order in which the firms decide on the offer of lifetime employment in the first two stages. This study presents the equilibrium outcomes of these two Stackelberg games. JEL: C72, D21, F23, L30

Keywords: State-owned firm; foreign labour-managed firm; Stackelberg games; lifetime employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0976747920941772 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:artjou:v:21:y:2022:i:1:p:27-42

DOI: 10.1177/0976747920941772

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().