Impact of Divorce Law Liberalisation on Domestic Violence

Shreya Malhotra

Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2024, vol. 23, issue 2, 223-243

Abstract: I examine the extent to which a shift from a mutual consent divorce regime to a unilateral divorce regime (UDR) succeeds in preventing domestic violence. In my framework, a partner may be inclined to violence but dislikes being subjected to a partner’s violence. I find that, when payoff from marriage is positive, both parties choose the maximum level of violence under a mutual consent regime (MCR). There is a parameter zone within which domestic violence falls as a transition is made to a UDR. Further, I find that policymakers can reduce the cost of filing for divorce. I also find that the marriage rate changes with the switch in the regime. JEL: C72, D10, D13, K36

Keywords: Family economics; game theory; mutual consent regime; non-cooperative games; unilateral divorce regime; domestic violence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:artjou:v:23:y:2024:i:2:p:223-243

DOI: 10.1177/09767479221096712

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