 Does the Offence– Defence Theory Explain War Onset Between Small States? Causes and Consequences of the 2020–2023 Armenia–Azerbaijan WarJavadbay Khalilzada Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2024, vol. 11, issue 2, 190-213 Abstract: The article explores the causes and consequences of the 2020–2023 Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan reclaimed large parts of territories within 44 days of the war in 2020, the country lost control in the early 1990s and was only hindered from full control by a Russian-brokered ceasefire. Over the subsequent three years, Azerbaijan gradually asserted dominance, reclaiming all lost territories by 2023. The study probes the war’s causes and Azerbaijan’s military success. It focuses on power imbalances and strategic dynamics between the two countries that led to the war. By applying the offence–defence theory, it argues that shifting economic and military strengths rendered war inevitable due to deadlock in negotiations. Azerbaijan’s military investment, modernisation and purchase of advanced technological armament changed the balance between the two states and increased its offensive advantage. The article also examines underlying regional power competition, shaping post-war dynamics in the South Caucasus. Keywords: The Karabakh War; causes and consequences of the Karabakh War; offence–defence theory; Azerbaijan; Armenia (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:asseca:v:11:y:2024:i:2:p:190-213 DOI: 10.1177/23477970241250099 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.