China’s Arrival in the Great Sanctions Game: A Learnt Response, Made by America

Sarah Tzinieris and Rishika Chauhan

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2025, vol. 12, issue 1, 81-108

Abstract: This article examines the development of China’s sanctions legislation in an era of strategic competition. Beijing’s new sanctions regime is informed by its experience as a sanctionee, with much of the new legislation almost directly mirrored on sanctions enacted against China by the West. The article seeks to account for Beijing’s interest in pursuing a formalised approach, employing four explanatory ‘models’, namely national security threats; retaliatory economic competition; status-seeking and prestige; and domestic constituents. The article argues that, despite China creating a new legislative framework, Beijing will continue to implement informal tactics for the most part, while employing formal measures in a targeted and measured way. Ultimately this two-pronged approach delivers a highly effective and adaptable toolkit of statecraft for China as an ascending power. However, there are normative implications for the orderly conduct of global trade and political cooperation as more states enter a great sanctions race.

Keywords: China; Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL); sanctions; Unreliable Entities List (UEL); coercive diplomacy; strategic competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:asseca:v:12:y:2025:i:1:p:81-108

DOI: 10.1177/23477970241298750

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