The Role of Side Payments in the Formation of Asymmetric Alliances: Forging the US–Pakistan Alliance

Muhammad Kabir

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2019, vol. 6, issue 2, 162-188

Abstract: Abstract The article builds on James Morrow’s theoretical formulation on asymmetric alliances, which contends that alliances are formed as a result of a security–autonomy trade-off between great powers and minor powers. It expands Morrow’s theory by showing that in the absence of a common threat or shared interests, the trade-off tends to leave a deficit in a weaker state’s net benefits from the alliance. I argue that side payments fill in the deficit in gains for weaker states. The article highlights the importance of domestic political constraints in shaping leaders’ alliance policies. I use the US–Pakistan alliance as a case study to probe the argument. The analysis presented here shows that the alliance, formed in 1954, was a result of a strategic trade-off between the United States and Pakistan. The case provides support to the argument that side payments played a crucial role in cementing the alliance.

Keywords: Alliance politics; asymmetric alliances; side payments; South Asia; the US–Pakistan relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:asseca:v:6:y:2019:i:2:p:162-188

DOI: 10.1177/2347797019842430

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