Board Composition and Performance of Indian State-owned Enterprises: Moderating Role of Leverage

Archana Goel and Utkal Khandelwal

Business Perspectives and Research, 2026, vol. 14, issue 3, 285-301

Abstract: Debt holders monitoring influence on the business performance has been noted in several research. Another body of research investigates the board of directors and performance linkages. The impact of debtholders on the board composition and firm performance linkage, particularly in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), has received little attention in the literature. As a result, this article aims to determine whether the composition of Indian SOE boards has an impact on their performance. It also looks into how leverage influences the association between the composition of Indian SOE boards and their performance. From 2001 to 2019, the panel data regression is performed on 19 Indian SOEs registered on the Bombay Stock Exchange. According to the study, board size, nominee directors improve Indian SOE performance, while independent directors reduce performance. Furthermore, in high-leverage SOEs, board of directors’ supervision is reduced or removed. The findings have implications for policymakers and the government.

Keywords: State-owned enterprises; corporate governance; leverage; firm performance; independent directors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:busper:v:14:y:2026:i:3:p:285-301

DOI: 10.1177/22785337221148295

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