Conflict Management and Peace Science

1973 - 2025

From Peace Science Society (International)
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The Political Economy of Arms Races and International Tension pp. 1-24: Michael D. Ward
The Military Power Potential of Nations: A Model and Some Measures pp. 25-31: Emilio Casetti
Structural Factors and International Crisis Behavior pp. 33-53: Patrick James and Jonathan Wilkenfeld
A Hypergraph Approach to Conflict pp. 55-69: M.B.M. de Koster and Jean Paelinck
From Fire to Frying Pan: The Impact of Major-Power War Involvement on Major-Power Dispute Involvement, 1816-1975 pp. 71-82: Richard J. Stoll

International Conflict Management via Adaptive Learning and Multistage Compromises pp. 1-24: David F. Batten
A Simulation Framework For Modeling Dynamics In Policy Space pp. 25-38: Luc Anselin
Analysis of Conflicts and Compromises, Using Qualitative Data pp. 39-64: Piet Rietveld
Dynamic Properties of the U.S. Military Expenditure Decision-Making Process pp. 65-86: Stephen J. Majeski
Social System Framework and Causal History: Part III, Interdependent Multi-Role Behavior and Operationally pp. 87-110: Walter Isard

Dynamic Modelling of the Cuban Missile Crisis pp. 1-18: Niall M. Fraser and Keith W. Hipel
A Model of Inter-Nation Hostility Dynamics and War pp. 19-37: Robert G. Muncaster and Dina A. Zinnes
Contagion at the Sub- War Stage: Siding in the Cold War, 1959â€“63 pp. 39-58: John M. Rothgeb
Social System Framework and Causal History: Part II Behavior Under Stress and Cognition pp. 59-93: Walter Isard

Preventing War by Nuclear Deterrence or by DÃ©tente pp. 1-18: Erich Weede
A Validation Study of Computer Simulations of the European â€œMajor Powerâ€ System: 1870-1914 pp. 19-38: Alex Mintz
Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2Ã—2 Games pp. 39-62: Steven Brams and Donald Wittman
Social System Framework and Causal History: Part I, Learning Processes pp. 63-94: Walter Isard

The Political Culture of Arab-Israeli Conflict pp. 79-94: William A. Gamson
Reflections on the History and Status of Peace Research pp. 95-110: Herbert C. Kelman
Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Public Goods Games pp. 111-120: T. M. Fogarty
An Experimental Examination of Samson's Dilemma pp. 121-138: Abraham Diskin and Dan S. Felsenthal
Nonmyopic Equilibria and the Middle East Crisis of 1967 pp. 139-162: Frank C. Zagare

Matching Conflict Situations and Conflict Management Procedures pp. 1-26: Walter Isard and Christine Smith
A Conflict Analysis of the Suez Canal Invasion of 1956 pp. 27-40: William M. Wright, Michael C. Shupe, Niall M. Fraser and Keith W. Hipel
Changing Patterns of Equilibria in the Arab-Israeli Conflict pp. 41-54: R. Hrair Dekmejian and Gideon Doron
Socio-Economic Dimensions of the Arms Race pp. 55-68: Panagis Liossatos
Statistical Study of the Richardson's Arms-Race Model With Time Lag pp. 69-78: Karmesh U

A Definition of Peace Science, the Queen of the Social Sciences: Part II pp. 97-132: Walter Hard
Diplomatic Time and Climate: A Formal Model pp. 133-150: Pierre Allan
The Conflict in South Africa: Directed or Chaotic pp. 151-168: David S. Tarbell and Thomas L. Saaty
Modeling The Nuclear Arms Race: A Search for Bounded Stability pp. 169-185: David S. Sorenson
Political Instability and Economic Inequality: Some Conceptual Clarifications pp. 187-198: William J. Linehan

A Definition of Peace Science, the Queen of the Social Sciences: Part I pp. 1-47: Walter Hard
Dynamics of Arms Races: Mutual Stimulation vs. Self-Stimulation pp. 49-66: Jean-Christian Lambelet, Urs Luterbacher and Pierre Allan
Conflict Patterns and Compromise Solutions in Fuzzy Choice Theory pp. 67-90: Peter Nijkamp
Comment on â€œEconomic and Demographic Determinants of the Viability of Nationsâ€ pp. 91-94: Simcha Moaz
Reply pp. 95-96: William J. Kelly

Economic Sanctions: The Theory And The Evidence from Rhodesia pp. 93-110: Richard C. Porter
A Catastrophe Surface in Mutual Deterrence Theory: Arms Limitation and Crisis Instability pp. 111-121: Robert H. Kupperman and Harvey A. Smith
Comments on â€œA Catastrophe Surface In Mutual Deterrence Theoryâ€ pp. 123-128: Lloyd J. Dumas
Rejoinder pp. 129-130: Robert H. Kupperman and Harvey A. Smith
A Formal Model of Big Step Disarmament and Domino Effects pp. 131-146: Walter Isard and Panagis Liossatos
Dyadic Linkage Politics in Lebanon pp. 147-158: Thomas J. Sloan
Statistical Problems Associated with The Richardson Arms Race Model pp. 159-172: Philip A. Schrodt
Nuclear Proliferation and Stability pp. 173-183: Michael Intriligator and Dagobert Brito

On the Mathematical Theory of Social Processes Characterized by Weak Reciprocity pp. 1-30: I. W. Sandberg
Modeling a Chimera: The Balance of Power Revisited pp. 31-44: Dina A. Zinnes, John V. Gillespie and G.S. Tahim
Major Powers and Weak Allies: Stability and Structure in Arms Race Models pp. 45-54: William H. Baugh
A Time Lagged Arms Race Model pp. 55-62: Walter W. Hill
Structure, Control and Language Hierarchies and World Organization pp. 63-91: Walter Hard and Phyllis Kaniss
Erratum pp. 92-92: N/a