Centralised vs. Decentralised Wage-Setting Systems and Capital Accumulation — Evidence from OECD Countries, 1960–1990

Anis Chowdhury

The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 1994, vol. 5, issue 2, 84-101

Abstract: There has recently been intense debate about the relative merits of a centralised wage-setting system vis-a-vis a decentralised system. Most of the theoretical and empirical works on this issue focus on the static or current macroeconomic performance in terms of employment and inflation and microeconomic efficiency resulting from enhanced labour market flexibility. Following Lancaster's work and subsequent extensions by Schott and Vartiainen, this paper regards wage bargaining as a dynamic game involving conflict over the distribution of current and future income. It is argued that the intertemporal decision makings of both workers and employers are influenced by so-called prisoners' dilemma. In such situations, it is claimed that centralised or corporatist wage negotiations system leads to higher investment rates. This claim is corroborated with evidence from selected OECD countries.

Date: 1994
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/103530469400500207 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecolab:v:5:y:1994:i:2:p:84-101

DOI: 10.1177/103530469400500207

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Economic and Labour Relations Review
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().