The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the European Union

Patrick Bernhagen and Neil J. Mitchell
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Patrick Bernhagen: University of Aberdeen, UK, p.bernhagen@abdn.ac.uk
Neil J. Mitchell: University of Aberdeen, UK, n.mitchell@abdn.ac.uk

European Union Politics, 2009, vol. 10, issue 2, 155-176

Abstract: Whereas research on corporate lobbying in the USA has produced a set of robust findings, less is known about the determinants of business political action in other policy arenas and beyond the nation-state. In particular, we do not know how well the standard profit-seeking model of firm political activity travels. The article examines this issue with an analysis of business lobbying in the EU that reflects tactical adaptation to lobbying at the supranational level. Using data on 2000 large companies, we show that a modified profit-seeking model of corporate political behaviour is generalizable to corporate lobbying in Brussels. By contrast, theories emphasizing nationally distinct types of interest intermediation find little support in the data.

Keywords: business interests; corporatism; large firms; lobbying; transnational corporations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:10:y:2009:i:2:p:155-176

DOI: 10.1177/1465116509103366

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