Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees

David Marshall
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David Marshall: London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, d.j.marshall@lse.ac.uk

European Union Politics, 2010, vol. 11, issue 4, 553-575

Abstract: This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee’s final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.

Keywords: committee organization; European Parliament; influence; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:553-575

DOI: 10.1177/1465116510382462

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