Co-decision after Lisbon: The politics of informal trilogues in European Union lawmaking

Gijs Jan Brandsma

European Union Politics, 2015, vol. 16, issue 2, 300-319

Abstract: Informal trilogues have become a standard operating procedure in the European Union’s ordinary legislative procedure. Generally, their occurrence is seen as a trade-off in which speed is prioritized over inclusive decision making. Hence, a relationship is assumed between intra-institutional processes and inter-institutional interactions. This article therefore tries to explain the number of informal trilogues in first readings. The contribution of this analysis is twofold. First, it shows that intra-institutional political processes such as contestation of the rapporteur’s preferences, politicization inside the Council and the number of shadow rapporteurs matter. Second, it for the first time measures the number of informal trilogues directly for the full population of post-Lisbon legislative files.

Keywords: Council of ministers; European Parliament; first-reading agreements; legislative processes; legitimacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:16:y:2015:i:2:p:300-319

DOI: 10.1177/1465116515584497

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