Transparency vs efficiency? A study of negotiations in the Council of the European Union

Sara Hagemann and Fabio Franchino

European Union Politics, 2016, vol. 17, issue 3, 408-428

Abstract: Recent studies suggest there is a direct trade-off between transparency and efficiency in legislative politics. We challenge this conclusion and present a bargaining model where one particular kind of transparency – the publication of legislative records – works to overcome problems of incomplete information. We also present empirical findings from legislative activities in the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2014 and from 23 interviews with senior officials in Brussels. Our results show that increased transparency, in the form of publication of legislative records, does not lead to gridlock or prolonged negotiations. On the contrary, recordings of governments’ positions help facilitate decision-making as it increases credibility of policy positions. This, in turn, lowers risk of negotiation failure and screens out marginal amendments.

Keywords: Bargaining; Council of Ministers; European Union; legislative behaviour; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:17:y:2016:i:3:p:408-428

DOI: 10.1177/1465116515627017

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