Specialists, party members, or national representatives: Patterns in co-sponsorship of amendments in the European Parliament

Inger Baller

European Union Politics, 2017, vol. 18, issue 3, 469-490

Abstract: Tabling committee amendments is an important way for Members of the European Parliament to influence legislation, build coalitions, and give signals to constituents. This article questions to what extent these coalitions follow party lines, national lines, or the logic of informational specialisation. Expectations are linked to the theories of legislative organisation and tested using exponential random graph models of the co-sponsorship patterns during the seventh legislature of the European Parliament. The results indicate that representing the same member state, sharing committee membership, and being affiliated to the same European Parliament Party Group all contribute to the formation of recurring co-sponsorship ties. Furthermore, this study indicates that especially the European United Left–Nordic Green Left has strong within-party co-sponsorship bonds and that Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe adopts a pivotal link between left and right in cross-party co-sponsorship.

Keywords: Amendments; co-sponsorship; European Parliament; exponential random graph models; parliamentary behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:18:y:2017:i:3:p:469-490

DOI: 10.1177/1465116517712049

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