The financial crisis and the European Parliament: An analysis of the Two-Pack legislation

Léa Roger, Simon Otjes and Harmen van der Veer

European Union Politics, 2017, vol. 18, issue 4, 560-580

Abstract: The left–right line of conflict has been the dominant dimension of decision-making in the European Parliament since 1979. A pro-/anti-European Union integration dimension is of secondary importance. Limited evidence exists on the conditions under which these different dimensions matter. This study examines parliamentary decision-making about the so-called Two-Pack, which moved responsibilities about budgetary decision-making to the European Commission. The article uses in-depth interviews, textual analysis of committee debates and roll call voting analysis in order to determine which lines of conflict matter at which stage of decision-making. The evidence indicates that left–right division is dominant in the informal stage preceding committee debates, while both the pro-/anti-European Union and the left/right dimensions matter during the committee stage, whereas for plenary votes, the pro-/anti-European Union dimension is crucial.

Keywords: Eurozone crisis; parliamentary voting; committee debates; economic left–right; European Union integration dimension (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:18:y:2017:i:4:p:560-580

DOI: 10.1177/1465116517716311

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