Institutionalist Research on the European Union

Keith Dowding
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Keith Dowding: London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

European Union Politics, 2000, vol. 1, issue 1, 125-144

Abstract: This article critically examines the recent wealth of institutionalist rational choice literature on the EU. It appraises the major fault lines and debates. It argues that non-cooperative game theory provides a thorough set of tools to examine the effects of different sorts of institutions upon the powers and limitations of different institutional actors. In certain areas scholars have not fully utilized the models applied to other political systems, but EU scholarship has taken a great leap forward in the past few years. Fully specified models with proper predictions are now being developed, though there is a tendency for modellers to introduce too many new assumptions that make empirical comparison with earlier models problematic, as it is sometimes hard to see which new assumptions are of most import. But we are into a new phase of normal science rational choice institutionalist explanation of the EU.

Keywords: European Union; institutionalism; rational choice theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:125-144

DOI: 10.1177/1465116500001001006

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