The Economy, Accountability, and Public Support for the President of the European Commission

Ronald D. Gelleny and Christopher J. Anderson
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Ronald D. Gelleny: Binghamton University (SUNY), USA
Christopher J. Anderson: Binghamton University (SUNY), USA

European Union Politics, 2000, vol. 1, issue 2, 173-200

Abstract: Using public approval for the President of the European Commission as an example, we investigate whether there are economic effects on public support for political authority: (1) when democratic accountability is absent; and (2) when public information about authorities is low. We find that economic effects as traditionally defined are weak, but that people make utilitarian assessments even when authorities cannot be held directly accountable. Moreover, the analyses suggest that voters with low levels of information, interest or awareness behave in ways that cannot be empirically distinguished from the behavior of well-informed voters. The findings imply that citizens employ utilitarian considerations when assessing political authorities even when they cannot hold them accountable or when they have little information about them.

Keywords: accountability; economic voting; European Commission; presidential approval; public opinion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:1:y:2000:i:2:p:173-200

DOI: 10.1177/1465116500001002002

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