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Trust spillovers among national and European institutions

Goran Dominioni, Alberto Quintavalla and Alessandro Romano
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Goran Dominioni: Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Alberto Quintavalla: Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

European Union Politics, 2020, vol. 21, issue 2, 276-293

Abstract: In this article, we study spillovers in political trust between the national parliaments of 15 Member States and the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the period 2000–2015. We show that in most instances spillovers between the national parliaments and the European Commission and the European Parliament are bidirectional, asymmetric, and change over time and place. A corollary of these findings is that simultaneously achieving high level of trust in institutions at different levels of governance may require a deeper understanding of the complex inter-institutional relationships that exist in the EU multilevel governance setting.

Keywords: Commission; European Parliament; institutional trust; trust spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:21:y:2020:i:2:p:276-293

DOI: 10.1177/1465116519897835

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