Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance
Fabio Franchino and
Additional contact information
Fabio Franchino: Department of Social and Political Sciences, UniversitÃ degli Studi di Milano, Italy
Camilla Mariotto: Department of Political Science, University of Innsbruck, Austria
European Union Politics, 2021, vol. 22, issue 4, 591-610
In the European Union, states can distribute enforcement prerogatives between a supranational agency, over which they exercise equal influence, and a Council of ministers, where power resources mostly vary by country size. What shapes attitudes towards different enforcement designs? States at greater risk of noncompliance should eschew deeper cooperation and prefer procedures over which they can exercise more influence. Employing an original data set of positions on relevant contested issues during the negotiations over fiscal governance rules from 1997 to 2012, we show that governments at greater risk of noncompliance prefer greater discretion and, if they have higher voting power, more Council involvement in enforcement. These factors only partially explain positions on Commission empowerment. Given their greater indeterminacy, attitudes are also shaped by national public opinion.
Keywords: Economic governance; enforcement design; international organisations; power asymmetry; state preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:22:y:2021:i:4:p:591-610
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in European Union Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().