Do political duos diminish discriminatory voter preferences? Evidence from a combined conjoint experiment

Alberto López Ortega

European Union Politics, 2024, vol. 25, issue 1, 106-129

Abstract: In Europe, more and more parties and governments are led by a pair of leaders. What consequences does the presence of duos have on voter preferences? I argue that voters have less discriminatory preferences against untraditional candidates when they choose two leaders instead of only one. However, discriminatory preferences do not entirely vanish; rather, traditionally excluded candidates are often relegated to secondary positions, and there exists a certain threshold of tolerated ticket diversity. Through a novel combined conjoint experiment, I find relative support for this conjecture, especially in the case of ethnic minority candidates. In view of the increasing number of new types of leadership, the results of this study have important implications for the study of political behaviour and elite diversity.

Keywords: Coalitions; co-leadership; conjoint experiment; diversity; voting behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:25:y:2024:i:1:p:106-129

DOI: 10.1177/14651165231206388

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