Social benefits for European Union immigrants? A survey experiment on misperceptions

Julian Jäger

European Union Politics, 2024, vol. 25, issue 2, 333-353

Abstract: Using new experimental panel data for Germany, I investigate the role of income misperceptions for welfare restrictive preferences toward European Union immigrants. A majority of respondents misperceive their relative income position in Germany and the European Union and demand that European Union immigrants work and pay taxes before obtaining equal rights to social benefits. Randomized treatments inform subjects about their position in the national and European Union income distribution. My results provide evidence that welfare restrictive preferences are formed in the context of misperceived own income positions: Respondents become more welfare restrictive when they learn about a higher national or lower European Union income position. Information about European Union misperceptions has a persistent treatment effect after 3 months, driven by respondents with larger initial misperceptions, but becomes insignificant after one year.

Keywords: Immigration; income; misperception; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:25:y:2024:i:2:p:333-353

DOI: 10.1177/14651165241229593

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