Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union

Robert Pahre
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Robert Pahre: Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA

European Union Politics, 2001, vol. 2, issue 2, 131-162

Abstract: A growing consensus maintains that divided government makes international cooperation more difficult. This paper takes issue with this claim. While divided government does make treaty ratification more difficult, it also affects the outcome when cooperation breaks down. To understand this effect of divided government, I bring the reversion point into the heart of the analysis of cooperation. If divided government makes this reversion point more unattractive than the reversion point under unified government, it may make cooperation more likely. Divided government also varies in ways previously overlooked in the literature, most importantly in whether the negotiator or ratifier controls the reversion point (or status quo). I test these claims against three supranational polities, the dual monarchies of Austria-Hungary and Sweden-Norway and the European Union today.

Keywords: European Union; international cooperation; divided government; Austria-Hungary; Sweden-Norway (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:2:y:2001:i:2:p:131-162

DOI: 10.1177/1465116501002002001

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