Strength in Numbers?

Jonathan Rodden
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Jonathan Rodden: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA jrodden@MIT.EDU

European Union Politics, 2002, vol. 3, issue 2, 151-175

Abstract: This article examines the relationship between territorial representation and fiscal redistribution in the European Union. Given that small states are vastly overrepresented in both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, models of legislative vote-buying predict that overrepresented member states will be systematically favored in the distribution of EU fiscal transfers. Empirical analysis of each manifestation of the EC or EU from 1977 to 1999 reveals a strong linear relationship between votes and transfers per capita during each period. This is true for both agricultural and regional development transfers as well as total net transfers. The paper concludes by reflecting on the importance of the connection between representation and redistribution as the European Union prepares to enlarge.

Keywords: federalism; representation; redistribution; vote-buying; transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:151-175

DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003002002

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