Which Decision Rule for the Future Council?

Hannu Nurmi and Madeleine O. Hosli
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Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku, Finland hnurmi@utu.fi
Madeleine O. Hosli: Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands m.hosli@scw.vu.nl

European Union Politics, 2003, vol. 4, issue 1, 37-50

Abstract: Decisions in the Council of Ministers continue to be surrounded by secrecy as far as the details of the decision-making process are concerned. Most of the research on reform efforts has focused on increasing transparency and on facilitating the management of various auxiliary bodies of the Council. In addition, a central focus has been placed on re-weighting of votes among the member states. In this article we argue that the current method of finding agreement and avoiding votes in the Council (`culture of consensus') will be impracticable with enlarged membership. Hence, formalized voting procedures will be needed. We discuss some desiderata of such procedures.

Keywords: Condorcet winner; Council of the EU; no-show paradox; voting procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:37-50

DOI: 10.1177/1465116503004001580

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