The European Court of Justice, Democracy, and Enlargement

Clifford J. Carrubba
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Clifford J. Carrubba: Emory University, USA ccarrub@emory.edu

European Union Politics, 2003, vol. 4, issue 1, 75-100

Abstract: In Europe, there is increasing concern with how the operation of the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament is creating a democratic deficit. One institution that is generally considered central to the effective functioning of a democratic system, but tends to be neglected in these discussions, is the European Court of Justice (ECJ). After all, it is at least ostensibly the job of the legal system to ensure that no one is above the law, not even governments. This study applies a theory of judicial politics to identify under what conditions the ECJ can act as an effective democratic check in the European Union and how enlargement may affect that role.

Keywords: democracy; enlargement; European Court of Justice; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:75-100

DOI: 10.1177/1465116503004001582

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