The Legislative Impact of the European Parliament Under the Revised Co-Decision Procedure

Christiane Kasack

European Union Politics, 2004, vol. 5, issue 2, 241-260

Abstract: This study analyses the legislative impact of the European Parliament (EP) under the revised co-decision procedure. I develop a model with adoption by Council and Commission as dependent variables and relative amendment importance, time of adoption, the amendment’s position in the legislation and internal parliamentary unity as independent variables. The results of my logistic regression question the common expectation that Co-decision II has increased the EP’s power. On the contrary, the rate of amendment adoption remains unchanged. The Commission’s influence during the second reading has, however, diminished. Furthermore, the study shows that the chance of an amendment made in the first reading being reintroduced increases in line with its adoption by the Commission and its non-adoption by the Council.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:241-260

DOI: 10.1177/1465116504038138

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