Accession and Reform of the European Union
Thomas König and
Thomas Bräuninger
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Thomas König: German University of Administrative Sciences, Germany
Thomas Bräuninger: University of Konstanz, Germany
European Union Politics, 2004, vol. 5, issue 4, 419-439
Abstract:
This study examines how the institutional provisions of the Nice Treaty and the constitutional reform of the European Union (EU) will affect agricultural decision-making in the enlarged EU. Although the agricultural sector is a core EU policy domain, we have little knowledge about the effects of institutional reform following the accession of 10 relatively small and poor countries, each having a large primary sector. Based on an input–output taxation model, we identify the positions of old and new member states in the twodimensional space of EU agricultural politics. This allows us to investigate whether and how Council decision-making will change if the Nice Treaty’s provisions for qualified majority voting are replaced by those of the draft constitution of 2004. Our analysis shows that the constitution is an advance providing for more policy change but it falls behind the Laeken proposal, which would have effectively reformed EU agricultural decision-making.
Keywords: agricultural policy; core; enlargement; institutional reform; qualified majority voting; spatial model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:5:y:2004:i:4:p:419-439
DOI: 10.1177/1465116504047311
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