Who Is Powerful?

Jonathan B. Slapin
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Jonathan B. Slapin: University of California, Los Angeles, USA

European Union Politics, 2006, vol. 7, issue 1, 51-76

Abstract: Previous studies have proposed competing theories to explain European intergovernmental conference (IGC) outcomes, but they fail to test these theories against one another. I examine the literature on IGC bargaining and derive several testable hypotheses. Using data on member state preferences at the IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, I first examine which member states favor integration and which are most skeptical of integration. I also determine which member states face the highest domestic ratification constraints. I then test the competing hypotheses found in the literature by calculating the bargaining strength of member states. I find that large member states have no more bargaining strength than the average member state; instead, domestic ratification constraints seem to confer power. States preferring less integration appear to outperform states desiring more integration. Supranational actors, as expected, have little power.

Keywords: intergovernmental conference; ratification constraints; spatial models; Treaty of Amsterdam; two-level games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:51-76

DOI: 10.1177/1465116506060912

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