Legislative Bargaining in the European Union

Paul Schure () and Amy Verdun

European Union Politics, 2008, vol. 9, issue 4, 459-486

Abstract: We analyse legislative bargaining in the European Union. In our model, EU member states bargain over the policy choices underlying legislation and over its `template': (1) the degree of discretion at the application stage, and (2) whether the discretionary power is delegated to the Commission (or retained by the Council). Our analysis classifies member states into `large', `medium-sized' and `small' based on their voting power in the Council. Large member states seek to adopt open-ended legislation in which the Council retains the discretionary power. Medium-sized ones prefer `clear rules' without discretion. Small member states prefer open-ended legislation in which discretion is delegated to the Commission. We discuss the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as an illustrative example.

Keywords: delegation; EU governance; legislative bargaining; small states; Stability and Growth Pact (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:9:y:2008:i:4:p:459-486

DOI: 10.1177/1465116508095146

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