Long-Term Contracts for Crude Oil Imports into Costa Rica: A General Equilibrium Analysis

Christian Dufournaud, Carlos Raul Gutierrez, Lodewijk Berlage and Peter P. Rogers

The Energy Journal, 1989, vol. 10, issue 1, 119-125

Abstract: Energy is critical for all human activity. Many countries import a major proportion of essential energy resources such as oil, for which the ability to substitute alternative inputs is difficult in both the short and long run. A possible response to the prospect that energy prices can fluctuate is for governments to negotiate long-term contracts with suppliers to mitigate sudden price shocks. This strategy is, however, not cost-free. It is equally rational for suppliers to negotiate high prices which protect them from the prospect of having to supply their oil at a lower price than they could anticipate in the future. A country seeking long-term protection from unstable oil prices via long-term contracts, therefore, faces higher current prices.

Keywords: Oil imports; Long-term contracts; Costa Rica; GE analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:10:y:1989:i:1:p:119-125

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol10-No1-10

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