OPEC Behaviour Under Falling Prices: Implications For Cartel Stability

Clifton T. Jones

The Energy Journal, 1990, vol. 11, issue 3, 117-130

Abstract: The surprising extended decline in real oil prices during the 1980s has raised the question of OPEC’s continued viability as a price-setting cartel. In response, Griffin’s (1985) tests of alternative hypotheses about OPEC behaviour performed over a period of generally rising prices (1971:1-1983:III) are repeated for the more recent period of falling prices (1983:IV-1988:IV), yielding the same general conclusions: most OPEC members continue to behave in a “partial market sharing†way, while most non-OPEC oil producers do not. Thus the evidence suggests that recent oil price reductions are more the result of deliberate output adjustments by the cartel than the unintentional outcome of a breakdown in cartel discipline on the way to eventual collapse.

Keywords: OPEC behavior; Cartel; Oil prices; Econometric analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:11:y:1990:i:3:p:117-130

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No3-6

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