Toward an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System*

Walter J. Mead

The Energy Journal, 1994, vol. 15, issue 4, 1-18

Abstract: The four principal leasing systems—work program, royalty, profit share (including rent resource tax), and bonus bidding—are reviewed relative to their efficiency in maximizing and collecting the present value of economic rents. Empirical research is shown to support theoretical conclusions that the most efficient system appears to be bonus bidding, without a fixed royalty, with leases issued in perpetuity, with environmental and other regulations required to pass a benefit/cost test, and with elimination of any nationalistic or other barriers to entry.

Keywords: Opitmal Leasing policy; Oil and gas exploration; US Gulf of Mexico; Bonus bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-No4-1 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:1-18

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-No4-1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Energy Journal
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().