An Oligopolistic Electricity Market Model with Interdependent Segments

Pierre-Olivier Pineau and Georges Zaccour

The Energy Journal, 2007, vol. 28, issue 3, 165-186

Abstract: In this paper, we model a two-period electricity market with interdependent demand, where oligopolistic generators make investments in peak- and baseload capacities. Different prices are obtained in the two periods, and residential consumers can react to prices across demand periods. We characterize the Cournot equilibrium obtained as a function of price and cross-price effects and present a numerical illustration based on the Ontario (Canada) electricity market.

Keywords: Electricity markets; Interdependent demand; Nash Equilibrium; Oligopoly; Liberalization; Ontario Canada (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:165-186

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol28-No3-9

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