Effects of Electric Utility Decoupling on Energy Efficiency

Jenya Kahn-Lang

The Energy Journal, 2016, vol. 37, issue 4, 297-314

Abstract: Most economists agree that revenue decoupling eliminates utilities’ incentives to encourage overconsumption of energy, but critics argue that decoupled utilities have no incentive to promote energy efficiency. This paper models the repeated game between regulator and utility and shows that decoupled utilities have greater equilibrium utility demand-side management (DSM) investment in the presence of DSM-related shareholder incentives. It then shows empirically that decoupling is historically associated with significant residential electricity consumption reductions, augmented DSM spending levels, and increased DSM investment efficacy.

Keywords: Decoupling; Demand-side management; Energy efficiency; Electric; utility regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.5547/01956574.37.4.jkah (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Effects of Electric Utility Decoupling on Energy Efficiency (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:37:y:2016:i:4:p:297-314

DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.4.jkah

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Energy Journal
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().