A Comparison of Regimes of Policies: Lessons from the Two-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Ching-Pin Chiu and Shih-Kung Lai
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Ching-Pin Chiu: Graduate Institute of Urban Planning, National Taipei University, 67, Section 3, Min Sheng East Road, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China
Shih-Kung Lai: Department of Urban Planning, National Cheng Kung University, 1 University Road, Tainan, Taiwan, Republic of China

Environment and Planning B, 2008, vol. 35, issue 5, 794-809

Abstract: On the basis of the presumption that the effects of plans for urban development are influenced highly by the decision mechanisms under which plans function, we compare deductively four interactive strategies derived from three regimes of policies, namely, fixed, emergent, and no policies, based on the two-person iterated prisoner's dilemma game. The four strategies under consideration are tit for tat (TFT), always defect (AD), always cooperate (AC), and random actions (RA). The results show that TFT is the best strategy followed by RA, AC, and AD. The implications are that policies that take into account contingencies yield higher expected payoffs than those that do not, and that emergent policies are more effective than either fixed or no policies. The model provides an analytical approach to the issue of evaluating the potential effects of the plans.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirb:v:35:y:2008:i:5:p:794-809

DOI: 10.1068/b33148

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