European Environmental Policy by Stealth: The Dysfunctionality of Functionalism?

A Weale
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A Weale: Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ, England

Environment and Planning C, 1999, vol. 17, issue 1, 37-51

Abstract: There are four paradoxes to be explained in respect of European Union (EU) environmental policy: how it is that a liberal policy regime makes relatively little use of economic instruments; how it is that the formally independent Commission is heavily dependent upon member states in the development of its policy proposals; how it is that a ‘weak’ European Parliament has had greater influence on environmental standard setting than have most national parliaments; and how it is that a supranational political authority regulates subnational environmental public goods so extensively. The author argues that these four features of EU environmental policy are related to one another as the effects of a common cause: the historical importance of the Monnet method of European integration. How far this method should be transcended is also discussed.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirc:v:17:y:1999:i:1:p:37-51

DOI: 10.1068/c170037

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