Political Benefits and Public Policy: Interpretation of Recent US Studies

B S Rundquist
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B S Rundquist: Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60680, USA

Environment and Planning C, 1983, vol. 1, issue 4, 401-412

Abstract: A number of researchers have tested the general hypothesis that the spatial allocation of political benefits by the US federal legislature is linked to the electoral demands on congressmen. The evidence produced by these tests is equivocal. To account for this situation, the theory underpinning the electoral benefit hypothesis is extended to take account of congressmen's needs for political support.

Date: 1983
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirc:v:1:y:1983:i:4:p:401-412

DOI: 10.1068/c010401

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