The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information

D Austen-Smith
Additional contact information
D Austen-Smith: Department of Economics, University of York, York Y01 5DD, England

Environment and Planning C, 1983, vol. 1, issue 4, 439-460

Abstract: The author reviews the literature on the spatial theory of electoral competition, initiated by Downs. Two main lines of inquiry are distinguished. The first is concerned with the purely analytical properties of majority preference as an aggregation rule for mapping individual preferences into social preferences. And the second is devoted to providing explanations of the choices of political decisionmakers, and the consequences of these choices, within a simple plurality electoral system. These two lines are intimately related and in the review the author seeks to explore this relationship.

Date: 1983
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1068/c010439 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirc:v:1:y:1983:i:4:p:439-460

DOI: 10.1068/c010439

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Environment and Planning C
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().