 How wars don’t end: A response to Gerard Toal’s analysis of ceasefire negotiations in UkraineVeronica Anghel Environment and Planning C, 2024, vol. 42, issue 7, 1139-1143 Abstract: Gerard Toal’s analysis of Ukraine and its allies’ hesitation to accept Russia’s peace terms, presented in ‘The Territorial Taboo: Explaining the Public Aversion to Negotiations in the Ukraine War Support Coalition’, attributes this reluctance to ‘commitment problems’ and ‘biases’. However, this explanation oversimplifies the issue. Achieving a stable post-agreement order necessitates Western resolve to provide security guarantees for Ukraine and a cohesive strategy regarding Russia’s role in the new global order. Toal’s suggestion of transferring occupied territories to end the war would enable Russia to further its goal of undermining Ukrainian sovereignty and bolster Putin’s dictatorship. This outcome contradicts NATO’s Strategic Concept, prolongs Ukrainian suffering, and perpetuates European security uncertainty. Furthermore, it would require a post-war narrative in which Ukrainians accept defeat and abandon their European aspirations. The resistance to Russia’s proposed settlement stems not from narrative taboos, but from a rational demand for a better resolution where unprovoked aggressors who want to upend international law through pre-modern lawlessness do not win the day. Keywords: Russia-Ukraine war; peace in Ukraine; NATO; transatlantic relationship; ceasefire negotiations (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirc:v:42:y:2024:i:7:p:1139-1143 DOI: 10.1177/23996544241276298 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Environment and Planning C |
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