Authoritarian environmentalism 2.0: An incremental transition of environmental governance in China

Chen Xiang and Alex Y Lo

Environment and Planning C, 2025, vol. 43, issue 4, 765-782

Abstract: The recent policy practice in China has shown nuanced differences from previous accounts of authoritarian environmentalism. The emerging discourse of green transformation shows dual tendencies for (re-)centralizing and decentralizing environmental institutions. Our understanding of authoritarian environmentalism in China requires an update. We review the recent policy practice and the scholarly literature to advance a modified framework of authoritarian environmentalism. Using the Central Environmental Inspection Teams and emissions trading schemes as examples, we highlight the coordinated practice of strengthening state control while strategically using mass mobilization and market mechanisms. We argue that non-state actors and bottom-up tools are being absorbed into the politics of (re-)centralization. The centralizing state accommodates a limited range of participatory and decentralizing elements in an attempt to modernize the governance system. Our modified framework recognizes the mutually reinforcing authoritarian and liberal elements, and sheds light on the broader trends of environmental governance in China.

Keywords: Authoritarian environmentalism; environmental governance; environment regulation; market mechanism; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirc:v:43:y:2025:i:4:p:765-782

DOI: 10.1177/23996544241286325

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