Optimal Decentralization—A Conceptual Approach to the Reform of German Federalism

D Biehl
Additional contact information
D Biehl: Institut für öffentliche Wirtschaft, Geld und Währung, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Mertonstrasse 17, Postfach 111932, D-6000 Frankfurt am Main 11, FRG

Environment and Planning C, 1989, vol. 7, issue 4, 375-383

Abstract: In the Federal Republic of Germany a tendency towards centralization can be identified. As it is difficult to decide whether this tendency increases or decreases welfare, a conceptual framework is developed that is based on an extended notion of costs in that it also allows a comparison of political with economic costs in the traditional sense. This approach allows the conceptual determination of an optimal degree of centralization/decentralization that depends on preference costs of citizens on the one hand [for instance, the costs of violated (‘frustrated’) values by a more centralized system] and resource costs (which increase with decentralization) on the other. This analysis also comprises as intermediate steps the derivation of certain principles that are elements of the theory of fiscal federalism.

Date: 1989
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1068/c070375 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirc:v:7:y:1989:i:4:p:375-383

DOI: 10.1068/c070375

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Environment and Planning C
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().