Toward a consensus on the intrinsic value of biodiversity

Katie H. Morrow

Environmental Values, 2025, vol. 34, issue 3, 262-279

Abstract: This article addresses the stalemate on the question of whether biodiversity has intrinsic value. I distinguish between a “weak†conception and two “strong†conceptions of intrinsic value in the environmental ethics literature. The strong conceptions of intrinsic value are connected, respectively, to moral standing and to a strongly objectivist account of value. Neither of these forms of value likely applies to biodiversity. However, the weak conception of intrinsic value is neutral about both moral standing and the nature of value and plausibly applies to biodiversity. In addition, weak intrinsic value avoids common objections to the claim that biodiversity is intrinsically valuable. I develop a cumulative argument showing that environmentalists should presume that biodiversity has intrinsic value in the weak sense.

Keywords: Biodiversity; intrinsic value; moral standing; subjectivism; Moore (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envval:v:34:y:2025:i:3:p:262-279

DOI: 10.1177/09632719231213750

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